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HUNGARY’S REFUGEE CRISIS: WHY A UNIFORM
APPROACH IS NOT THE SOLUTION
YVONNE KUPFERMANN*
ABSTRACT
The recent refugee crisis that swept over many European nations
requires an inquiry into how to balance humanitarian concerns with the
resources of the respective nations involved. Oftentimes, the approach is
purely humanitarian, placing much of the focus on inclusion and resettle-
ment. However, countries that stray from this humanitarian approach are
often criticized. This Note aims to offer a new theoretical framework for
analyzing a refugee crisis of this scope. It uses Hungary as a case study to
demonstrate how history can play a role in how a refugee crisis is handled
and to provide concrete examples of a country receiving backlash for imple-
menting protectionist measures. Broadly stated, this Note highlights the
importance of avoiding uniform solutions for nations of differing postures
by providing the relevant factors to consider when approaching an emer-
gency of this type.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of a rapidly growing European population, human
rights have been at the forefront of many European leaders’ minds.
This focus is much deserved, as populations in some European nations
have nearly doubled in a mere few months.1  The scale of the refugee
crisis, though always relevant, has become increasingly so by the lack of
remedies in place for a problem of this scope.  European leaders have
been reprimanded for the measures they have implemented, suggesting
that they are insensitive to the greater human rights issue at stake with-
out acknowledging that no other adequate solution is in place.2  Given
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts in
Psychology and Political Science, University of Michigan, 2014. Thank you to Professor
Christine Ventor for her unconditional support throughout this process and for making
my vision possible, to the members of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Pol-
icy for never complaining about how wrong my Bluebook citations were, and to my won-
derful Mom and Dad for always inspiring me to pursue my passions within Immigration
Law. I am so grateful.
1. See Amanda Taub, Europe’s refugee crisis, explained, VOX (Sept. 5, 2015, 11:40 AM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/9/5/9265501/refugee-crisis-europe-syria (noting that since
the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, four million people have fled the country and
that many of these migrants fled to Europe, estimating that 42,500 more individuals join
the migration daily).
2. Holly Yan et al., Refugee crisis: Hungary uses tear gas, water cannons on migrants at
border, CNN (Sept. 16, 2015, 3:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/16/world/europe-
migrant-crisis/ (reporting that in response to migrants entering the country, the Hun-
garian government blocked its borders with a razor-wire fence and had Hungarian police
respond to the situation with tear gas and water cannons and that Hungary was placed
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the many political and world leaders that have criticized the actions of
the Hungarian government, a more pressing issue has risen to the sur-
face.  This issue urges the consideration of whether the European
Union’s mission of opening its borders through its European Union
member-states is, in fact, in direct conflict with a nation’s right to pre-
serve its own cultural identity.  Further, it questions whether the right of
individuals to be refugees is at odds with a nation’s right to cultural
identity and, if so, what remedies can be put into place to combat this
conflict.  While these rights, with regard to how they co-exist, are not
ones that have been tested before, they are becoming the foundation
for how to propose remedies that nations would be willing to
implement.
This assessment is one that requires more than just an analysis of
the current state of the refugee crisis and how various nations are
responding to it.  It requires a step back and a more general overview of
the rights that are in question.  Given that many of the European
nations being targeted by migrants are nations in which there have
been conflicts surrounding cultural identity due to war or economic
instability, the history of these nations becomes an important lens
through which to understand why a nation desires to protect its cultural
identity.  This is especially true in the context of Hungary, as the coun-
try has fought its way to being proud of the Hungarian identity after
years of concealing it following the world wars.  Thus, this Note aims to
examine the relevant rights that are at stake—the right to refugee status
and the right to preserve a country’s cultural identity—through the spe-
cific case study of Hungary.  After these rights are examined in greater
detail, the solutions that some nations have implemented will be intro-
duced, providing a foundation for how a nation like Hungary could
respond to the refugee problem.  This study will reveal the distinction
between refugees and migrants and a country’s duty in the face of each;
it will provide context for Hungary’s response to the refugee crisis
through an examination of the nation’s history and heightened focus
on cultural identity; and it will aim to reconcile the mission of the Euro-
pean Union in opening nations’ borders while also stressing the impor-
tance of giving deference to a nation’s right to preserve its own cultural
identity and protecting individuals’ right to refuge.  The need for
proactive remedies is one of the most fundamental issues surrounding
the refugee crisis in Europe.  While it is also one of the most difficult
issues, an examination of other nations’ approaches presents the idea
that a uniform approach to the refugee crisis may not be the best one.
Giving deference to countries through what is known as the “margin of
appreciation,”3 in a sense, encompasses what may happen if solutions to
the crisis are implemented and forced upon the relevant European
under fire by other European Union nations for using “not acceptable” measures that
were “against . . . European rules” but that the Hungarian police force maintained that
“proportionate police force” was being used).
3. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?,
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005).
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countries.4  Additionally, acknowledging a nation’s right to preserve its
cultural identity through the various remedies that could be imple-
mented by the European Union, for example, may increase the nation’s
willingness to adopt these remedies.  Thus, the idea of implementing a
remedy coincides with the understanding of what rights are at stake and
why these rights should shape the type of remedy that is implemented.
II. THE RIGHTS AT STAKE
A. The Right to Refugee Status
After World War I, “millions of people fled their homelands in
search of refuge.”5  This large number of fleeing refugees created a
need for international travel documents that regulated the movement
and entitled these individuals to certain rights in the new countries.  As
a response, in 1951, following a Geneva conference, a key document
was created that outlined the definition of who is considered a refugee,
the relevant rights of the refugees, the obligations of nations in the face
of these rights, and what groups of people do not need to be afforded
this set of rights.6  This became known as the 1951 Convention.  In
addition, because this document was narrowly tailored to only refer-
ence European refugees following the war, amendments were made to
the Convention, creating a 1967 Protocol that removed the narrow
scope and placed it in the context of the entire world.7  This guaran-
teed that the rights outlined in the document were available not only to
the European refugees, but also to others who were similarly situated
because of states of conflict.  However, it is important to note that at the
creation of the 1951 Convention, there was not a pressing concern that
refugees entering nations could pose a risk through acts of terrorism.
Because of this, there is a lack of heightened security through stricter
rules in the 1951 Convention that would account for these types of
dangers.
This international convention is often cited at the crux of this
human rights issue because it recognizes that a nation-state, especially
during a time of conflict, can infringe upon the liberties that individu-
als have and force them to take steps to regain this sense of liberty.  In
many cases, this entails individuals fleeing from their home countries in
order to escape the conflict and oppression.  In relevant part, the docu-
ment outlines that a refugee is an individual who has a “well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion” and “is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
4.  CHRISTINE M. VENTER, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE
315 (2012).
5. U.N. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html.
6. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951 (entered into
force Apr. 22, 1954), 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
7. U.N. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 5.
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unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”8  This defi-
nition of a refugee excludes individuals who:
[have] voluntarily re-availed [themselves] of the protection of the
country of [their] nationality; or, having lost nationality . . . volun-
tarily re-acquired it; or [have] acquired a new nationality, and
enjoys the protection of the country of new nationality; or . . .
[they] can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion
with which [they were] recognized as [refugees] have ceased to
exist, continue to refuse to avail [themselves] of the protection of
the country of nationality.9
These exclusions suggest that the right of an individual to be a refugee
is not absolute.  Rather, it is a limited right that requires individuals to
be of a specific category before they can claim the rights outlined in the
Convention from the nations to which they are fleeing.  This becomes
especially relevant when refugees discuss their desire to assimilate into
the country they have fled to, as they should be afforded the same
rights that other citizens in that nation have if the nation’s resources
allow for it, but not necessarily an increased amount of rights due to
their refugee status.
Further, in the specific context of Hungary, the Prime Minister,
Viktor Orbán, has raised concerns that the “‘overwhelming majority’ of
migrants in Europe are not refugees but are merely seeking a better
life.”10  This distinction is important in the context of the 1951 Conven-
tion because “the 1951 Refugee Convention and a string of EU laws
[urge that] European countries must offer refuge or other types or pro-
tection to asylum-seekers who can demonstrate that they are fleeing war
or persecution.”11  This suggests that, even if the migrants are leaving
behind a worse life with poverty and less opportunity, European coun-
tries are under “no such obligation” to these migrants in terms of
affording them rights.12  Thus, if it is true that the majority of “refu-
gees” in Hungary are considered economic migrants rather than refu-
gees,13 then Hungary owes no duty to them under the 1951
Convention.  This may also be true, then, if the refugees are discovered
to be a danger, in any capacity, to the new country.  Thus, any proposed
solutions to the refugee crisis should acknowledge this distinction.
If, however, this is not the case and the migrants are, indeed, refu-
gees that are fleeing from a situation of conflict, the 1951 Convention
provides that countries must accord refugees treatment “at least as
favourable as that accorded to their nationals.”14  Specifically, the coun-
8. 1951 Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1.
9. Id.





13. As stated, economic migrants are those that are seeking a better life due to
destitution rather than fleeing war or persecution.
14. 1951 Convention, supra note 6.
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try must accord various rights and freedoms including: the freedom to
practice their own religion; lawful residence following “forcible dis-
placement;” an acknowledgement of particular rights (e.g. marriage);
“the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country” with
regard to artistic rights and industrial property; the right of association;
“free access to the courts of law on the territory of all contracting
states;” the right to wage-earning employment, self-employment, and
liberal professions; the right to public education and housing; the right
to administrative assistance and social security; the right to transfer
assets, the prohibition of expulsion of refugees; and, finally, the facilita-
tion of naturalization.15  This extensive list of rights, carefully detailed
throughout the international convention, suggests that refugees are
held to nearly the same standard as a country’s own nationals.  While
this is positive in regard to the human rights sphere and granting indi-
viduals the rights they are typically fleeing their home countries for, it
presents many issues as well.
For example, the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol contain pro-
cedural inconsistencies on how to determine if particular migrants are
refugees or economic migrants or, even, whether or not the individual
in question fits within the definition of a refugee.16  This lack of a clear
procedural element “resulted in disparities among different States as
governments craft asylum laws based on their different resources,
national security concerns, and histories with forced migration move-
ments.”17  While the creation of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col were significant steps in understanding the rights of refugees, they
also highlighted an issue that goes to the understanding of how the
rights of cultural identity and the right to refuge can co-exist.  If there
are disparities among nations on how to define who is a refugee for
purposes of according these individuals the proper rights as outlined by
the 1951 Convention, the disparities likely reflect the ability of each
nation, in terms of its available resources, to house the increasing num-
ber of refugees.  Additionally, it may also reflect the level of commit-
ment a nation may feel to protecting its cultural identity.  If a nation
has a greater commitment to preserving its cultural identity and wants
to prevent individuals—individuals with their own dominant cultural
identities—from fleeing to their country, then it may be less likely to
recognize individuals under a refugee status in its asylum laws.
B. Other Obstacles to Implementation of Rights
Another significant issue with the rights outlined by the 1951 Con-
vention and the 1967 Protocol is the weak implementation by countries
of these refugee rights.  A document by the United Nations High Com-
15. Id. at 4.
16. See Asylum & the Rights of Refugees, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CENTER, http://www
.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/ (noting that while the definition of who qualifies as a refugee
is included in the 1951 Convention, there is no way for “States parties . . . to determine
whether an individual meets the definition of a refugee”).
17. Id.
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missioner for Refugees disclosed three obstacles of implementation.
These obstacles were summarized as fitting into three categories: “socio-
economic, legal and policy or practical.”18  These obstacles were identi-
fied after a recent inter-sessional meeting of the Sub-Committee where
the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees were to submit
basic questions about implementation.19  They acknowledged that a
tension exists between what nations are able to do in the best interest of
their own citizens versus what the nations are able to do to aid refugees.
The socio-economic obstacle stems from countries “suffering their own
severe economic difficulties, high unemployment, declining living stan-
dards, shortages in housing and land and/or continuing man-made
and natural disasters,” and not having the additional resources to ade-
quately aid refugees.20  The legal obstacle suggests that there are
“inconsistencies between, existing national laws and certain Convention
obligations.”21  In other words, the Convention obligations are not
being reflected in the national laws and, thus, are not being followed by
individual nations.  Additionally, the “protection of refugee rights
becomes an exercise of powers and discretion by officials, rather than
enforcement of specific rights identified and guaranteed by law.”22
Finally, the practical flaws of implementation include the “maintenance
of the geographic limitation by some countries.”23  Other than the
three primary obstacles, the weak implementation of the rights of refu-
gees by individual countries was also attributed to the varying interpre-
tations and selective application of the definition of a refugee.24  These
differing interpretations may stem from the lack of a definition for cer-
tain terms in the Convention (e.g., persecution and well-founded
fear).25  Thus, a summary of four issues that countries face in imple-
mentation was created: the better promotion of implementation by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the possibilities for
monitoring implementation; the difficulties in fulfilling Convention
obligations (largely due to a lack of resources and a lack of legal pres-
ence in national laws) and varying interpretations and selective applica-
tion of Article 1 of the Convention; and the extent to which these limit
the proper application of the Convention.26
Thus, while human rights advocates were quick to applaud the
implementation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol as a
step in the right direction for recognizing the rights of refugees, many
issues still exist with both the understanding of the rights as well as the
18. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Implementation of the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees—Some Basic Questions, U.N. Doc. EC/








26. Id. (discussing the definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1 of the
Convention).
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implementation of these rights by individual nations.  This is not to say
that the right to be a refugee is not recognized and deserving of signifi-
cant attention.  Rather, it provides a framework through which to
understand that, despite the implementation of this Convention,
nations often prioritize what would be best for their own citizens and
what they are able to accomplish with their resources over the rights of
these refugees, and that this idea must be reflected in the proposals of
solutions to the problem.  While a nation prioritizing its own interests
may be seen as unacceptable27 and against the purpose of implement-
ing this international convention, it also demonstrates that preserving a
country’s cultural identity may seep into the established rights of refu-
gees, creating difficulties in prioritizing the rights of refugees over the
preservation of cultural identity.  This is especially true if refugees may
pose danger to a particular nation.
C. The Right to Preserve Cultural Identity
While the right to preserve cultural identity is not as clearly estab-
lished as the right to refugee status, many sources, namely, current
human rights laws, provide guidelines for the interpretation of this
right.  As it stands, there is significant movement toward a right to cul-
tural identity in international human rights law.28  To best understand
why, there is a need to establish what cultural identity means as both a
collective right (seen in the contexts of nations) and as an individual
right.  First and foremost, the idea of cultural identity suggests that
there is “structural stability in a community or group of people”
because of their “sameness.”29  “[C]ultural identity is compound and
composed of multi-dimensions that will increase and tend to be more
complex with development of society.”30  This idea that cultural iden-
tity will tend to be more complex with the development of society is
particularly important in the present context.  Given that what ties indi-
viduals together is their “sameness” through more areas than just
“shared cultural values,” a history of having to conceal that cultural
identity or fight harder to establish it may promote an increase in a
nation’s desire to protect it.31  Moreover, “there is an increasing
demand to secure the right to cultural identity as a human right since
restriction or oppression of cultural identity can lead to confusion,
alienation or even violent conflict.”32  This best explains the scope of
the right on both a macro and a micro level.
Cultural rights have primarily found their grounding in two inter-
national human rights documents: the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on
27. Shany, supra note 3, at 930.
28. Towards a Right to Cultural Identity in International Human Rights Law, CULTURAL
RIGHTS, http://www.culturalrights.net/en/revisiones.php?c=12&p=110 [hereinafter CUL-
TURAL RIGHTS].
29. YUSI TENG, CULTURAL IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2–3 (2008).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 28.
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Civil and Political Rights.  The two relevant sections of these covenants
are Article 15 and Article 27, respectively.33  Article 15 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides that
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of eve-
ryone: [t]o take part in cultural life . . . . The steps to be taken . . . to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for
the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and cul-
ture.”34  Similarly, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture . . . or to use their own language.”35
An examination of these provisions demonstrates a commitment in the
human rights sphere to prevent deprivation of individuals’ rights to
practice their own culture or to associate themselves with their cultural
ideals.
While critics may argue that the development of a concrete right to
preserve cultural identity, within human rights covenants, for example,
could have negative consequences due to “the vagueness of the con-
cept” of cultural identity as well as the “risk of abuse” by countries,
“[m]any communities and individuals need protection of their cultural
identity.”36  This protection is so important that “[i]t should be the
basis to end policies of forced assimilation and discrimination.”37  To
understand the connection between cultural identity and migration, it
is also important to acknowledge that cultural identity can be lost, creat-
ing feelings of “dislocation, alienation, and isolation.”38  However,
upon settling into a new nation and being exposed to a new culture,
“cultural identity is likely to change and that encourages a degree of
belonging.”39  Here, it becomes more transparent why a nation’s desire
to preserve its own community’s cultural identity could be at conflict
with an individual’s desire to obtain a new cultural identity in order to
feel a sense of belonging.  In leaving their respective countries, eco-
nomic migrants and refugees alike desire to detach from their home
country to either move on to a better life with more opportunities or to
escape a situation of dangerous conflict.  This likely allows fleeing indi-
viduals to change aspects of their cultural and ethnic identities.40  So,
the question becomes, what happens when these cultural identities
interact with one another?  While many migrants and refugees hope to
assimilate into their new country, “[t]he process of acculturation
33. Id.
34. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
36. CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 27.
37. Id.
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requires two cultures to come into contact and both cultures may expe-
rience some change.  In reality, however, one cultural group will often
dominate the other group.”41  This specific principle is one that
requires the most attention in examining the connection between the
right to refuge and the right to preserve cultural identity.
When migrations include large groups of people, these individuals
travel in groups and settle in one country.  This country, then, is likely
filled with individuals that are bonded together through their cultural
identities.  This identity may even be strengthened by the fact that these
individuals have experienced the same conflict situations or are trying
to escape their home countries with the same motivations of finding a
better opportunity or better life for themselves and their families.
Thus, the cultural identity of these migrants now conflicts with the new
country’s cultural identity.  While it is said that, typically, one cultural
group will dominate the other cultural group in situations where two
cultural identities come in conflict with one another, the concern of
the new country is that the cultural identity of the large numbers of
migrants will begin to dominate instead of the other way around.  Thus,
this creates resentment within the new country in accepting these
migrants or refugees and encouraging their assimilation into the coun-
try.  This is especially true when countries have previously fought for
their right to practice their own culture or if the new refugees/migrants
are considered dangerous.42
III. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Hungary’s Fight
The strong sense of preservation of the Hungarian identity did not
only find its source from the usual pride and loyalty a citizenry feels
towards its “home country.”  Hungarians’ unparalleled attachment
stems from its citizenry having to bond together after being deprived of
practicing their own cultural traditions and publicizing their cultural
identity.  To understand why it can be said that Hungary has fought for
its right to practice its own culture, an examination of the end of World
War I and World War II is of particular relevance.
At the beginning of World War II, Hungary had hope that it would
be able to reinstate the Hungarian kingdom—a kingdom that had lost a
vast amount of its territory through the Treaty of Trianon following
World War I.  This treaty re-drew the borders of Hungary so that the
country would lose “two-thirds of its prewar territory and 40 per cent of
its population to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania.”43  As a con-
sequence of this, Romania had the largest population of Hungarian
minorities living within its borders.44  The conflict between Hungary
41. Id. at 134.
42. TENG, supra note 29.
43. Martin Mevius, Kicking Under the Table: Minority Conflict Between Hungary and
Romania, in ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND THE EUROPEAN COLD WAR 87, 87 (Robert Knight
ed., 2014).
44. Id.
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and Romania, specifically, is the most important for understanding
Hungary’s preservation of its cultural identity.  Viewing the conflict
through the relationship between Hungary and Romania is not
intended to suggest that Hungary was only at odds with Romania dur-
ing this time.  Rather, it is reflective of Hungary suffering the greatest
loss of its people to Romania.  This conflict between Romania and Hun-
gary was reignited during World War II because, as a result of World
War II, Transylvania was redistributed to Romania.
According to the 2011 census, there were “about 1.2 million ethnic
Hungarians in Romania, making up 6.5% of the total population.”45
The ethnic Hungarians living in the now-Romanian land of Transylva-
nia were subjected to extreme oppression by the Romanian political
regime.  Given the hostility between the countries following many redis-
tributions of land, it was in Romania’s best interest to treat the ethnic
Hungarians as their own citizens, urging the citizens to assimilate into
the Romanian culture by speaking their language instead of Hungarian
and practicing Romanian cultural traditions rather than their own.  For
example, Romanian officials “banned the hoisting of the Szekely flag
atop office buildings,” a flag that represented traditional Hungarian
culture.46  In response to these discriminatory actions, Hungary’s
ambassador to Romania, at the time, expressed support for ethnic Hun-
garians aligning themselves with Szekely values.47  Additionally, in May
2010, “the Hungarian parliament decided to give ethnic Hungarians
who live outside the country the right to claim Hungarian nationality as
a second citizenship—which potentially includes the right to vote.”48
Romanian officials were unpleased with these advances by the Hun-
garian government, saying that these actions interfered with “domestic
Romanian affairs.”49  The Romanian response to these acts of “disloy-
alty” was complete isolation.50  In order to further this isolation, the
government shut down the border with Hungary completely—arresting
and shooting peasants that were working at the Hungarian border.51
It is also important to note that the Szekely region—a region
largely encompassed within the borders of Transylvania—was one of
the poorest in Romania.52  This makes the citizens that occupy this land
“particularly susceptible to political manipulation, from both Romanian
and Hungarian politicians [and,] [i]n this context, the appeal to
nationalism is often a common strategy.”53  However, ethnic Hungari-
ans stress the importance of being able to preserve their cultural iden-
tity, specifically through “the ability to teach their own language in
45. Stratfor, Hungary and Romania Face Off over an Ethnic Dispute, EURACTIV (Feb. 21,






50. Mevius, supra note 43, at 102.
51. Id.
52. Stratfor, supra note 45.
53. Id.
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schools or fly their own flags.”54  While these desires of the ethnic Hun-
garians do not necessarily threaten the unity of the Romanian territory,
they have “strengthened regionalist sentiments that were previously
dormant elsewhere.”55  This suggests that there are many areas of
Europe, particularly through the examination of minority groups living
in other countries, where the minority group’s cultural identity is in
conflict with the dominant cultural identity.  While it is true that many
of these conflicts are not readily apparent, Hungary’s dedication to pre-
serving its cultural identity is apparent through not only the ethnic
Hungarians living in Romania, but also the values that are embodied by
the Hungarian citizens living in Hungary.
Almost all states in East-Central Europe have recognized in their
respective constitutions “a responsibility toward individuals belonging
to the given cultural or ethnic nation.”56  The Hungarian Constitution,
itself, contains many provisions that suggest a commitment to further-
ing the right to Hungarian culture.  For example, the Preamble pro-
claims “that [their] national culture is a rich contribution to the
diversity of European unity [and they] commit to promoting and safe-
guarding [their] heritage, [their] unique language, [and] Hungarian
culture . . . .”57  The Hungarian Constitution is also unique in its loyalty
to ethnic Hungarians that are living outside of the country.  Article D of
the Hungarian Constitution states:
Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that
belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of
Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival
and development of their communities, shall support their efforts
to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use of their
individual and collective rights, the establishment of their commu-
nity self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands,
and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with
Hungary.58
This demonstrates a heightened level of commitment to Hungarians
and preserving the Hungarian identity, likely as a consequence of los-
ing a large number of ethnic Hungarians to the re-drawing of the
nation’s borders.
It is through this historical framework and understanding of the
Hungarian Constitution that it becomes apparent that Hungary’s scope
of commitment to culture goes beyond that of the Hungarian commu-
nity.  While the commitment to Hungary’s culture likely takes prece-
dent over other cultures, the Hungarian Constitution carves out a
provision specifically for other countries.  The Preamble to the Consti-
tution states, “We respect the freedom and culture of other nations,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. ENIKŐ HORVÁTH, MANDATING IDENTITY: CITIZENSHIP, KINSHIP LAWS AND PLURAL
NATIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 139 (2008).
57. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25 2011, (Hung.).
58. Id. at art. D.
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and shall strive to cooperate with every nation of the world.”59  Thus,
there is an interest taken by the Hungarian government in uniting the
many cultures of Europe.  While this likely does not suggest that Hun-
gary would agree to a decreased presence of Hungarian culture in its
own country, it may suggest that there is a way for a nation’s preserva-
tion of its cultural identity to not only align with other cultures, but also
to be able to co-exist with one another.  This is also one of the many
ideals the European Union aims to further through its mission
statement.
B. The Mission of the European Union
Despite many nations’ concerns about protecting their own cul-
tural identities, the European Union initiated the idea of having a
“European cultural identity” with a desire to unite European nations
together and to open borders between them.60  However, this cultural
ideal was not the original springboard for the creation of the European
Union despite being the one that is in greater focus now when thinking
about the European Union.  The European Union was founded on the
belief that, following an environment of high conflict in Europe during
World War II, “countries that trade with one another become economi-
cally interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.”61  The result
of this was the European Economic Community that included Belgium,
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.62  This eco-
nomic community, then, transformed itself into a political one.  The
political nature is best seen through its democratic process, allowing all
member-states to agree upon “voluntarily and democratically” binding
agreements that set out the European Union’s goals in many areas of
activity.63  This is when the European Economic Community formally
transitioned into the European Union that is thought of today.
The European Union’s goals span many different policy areas.
The relevant focus groups—in the context of the refugee crisis and
Hungary—include the discussions of human rights and the policies
focusing specifically on humanitarian aid.  In the realm of human
rights, the European Union policy works toward “[promoting] the
rights of women, children, minorities and displaced persons,” and
“defending the universal and indivisible nature of human rights through
full and active partnership with partner countries, international and
regional organisations, and groups and associations at all levels of soci-
ety.”64  Further, the European Union “pursues human rights dialogues
with over 40 countries and organisations” with an annual report that
59. Id.
60. See generally TENG, supra note 29.
61. The EU in Brief, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-
in-brief_en (last updated Oct. 11, 2016).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Human Rights, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/hu
man-rights_en (last updated Oct. 11, 2016).
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“appraises its human rights work worldwide.”65  In the realm of human-
itarian aid and civil protection, the European Union works in all major
crisis areas and in countries facing post-conflict instability.66  Its goals
include: saving lives, reducing suffering, and protecting the security
and dignity of those affected.67  While this mission becomes significant
in the arena of the refugee crisis, the European Union’s annual budget
is limited and, thus, resources can be sparse in times of need.68
It is through an examination of these two policy areas that one can
see the mission of “opening borders.”  The idea of opening borders is
one that poses the most conflict with the desire to preserve a nation’s
cultural identity.  Because the European Union aims to “defend human
rights” through an “active partnership” with other nations and organi-
zations, a nation’s cultural identity may be pushed into the background
to pursue larger policy goals.69  However, this is not the case.  While the
European Union establishes these goals that all of the member-states
voluntarily agree upon and implement, it offers great deference to the
individual member-states to achieve these goals.  Hungary is, in fact, an
important case study of a member-state that does not meet all of the
requirements of the European Union in order to best protect its own
country.  Here, one can begin to see how the ideas of cultural identity
and the opening of borders can co-exist.
C. The Connection Between the European Union and the Refugee Crisis
The European Union’s connection to the refugee crisis forces the
reconciliation of three important ideas: (1) the European Union’s mis-
sion of opening borders among countries; (2) the European Union’s
policy focus of human rights and preventing discrimination; and (3)
nations’ individual desires to maintain their own cultural identities.
These ideas can be reconciled through the examination of what poli-
cies the European Union currently has in place to aid the refugees and
what it has done in response to the refugee crisis in many European
countries, including Hungary.
Currently, the European Union has a Common European Asylum
System (CEAS) that “ensure[s] that the rights of refugees under inter-
national law are protected in its member states [by setting] out mini-
mum standards and procedures for processing and assessing asylum
applications, and for the treatment of both asylum seekers and those
who are granted refugee status.”70  The issue with this system is that
many European Union member-states have failed to implement the sys-
tem correctly, producing, once again, interpretations of what the sys-
65. Id.
66. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/humanitarian-aid-civil-protection_en (last updated Oct. 11, 2016).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Human Rights, supra note 64.
70. Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS.,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asy-
lum-european-union (last updated October 2015) [hereinafter OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS.].
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tem is intended to do and creating uneven results.71  The European
Union also has a “Dublin system” in place for asylum seekers traveling
through many of the European Union member-states.  This system
“allows one EU country to send that person to the first EU country
reached by the asylum seeker, so long as that person upholds the rights
of asylum seekers.”72  This system, like the original CEAS, does not cre-
ate many transfers and the “failures of asylum systems in Greece, Italy,
and Hungary have led courts to block transfers.”73
Given the failures of these systems, the European Union “pledged
to take immediate action to prevent further losses of life and to improve
conditions for those seeking protection in Europe [by relocating]
migrants who reach the EU from countries at the EU’s external fron-
tiers—like Italy, Greece, and Hungary—to countries which have few
arrivals.”74  While the European Union can be seen taking actions that
promulgate the human rights policies that are in place, there is also
some consideration of the best interest of the member-states.  For
example, through the current response to the refugee movement (of
relocation to countries with few refugee arrivals), the European Union
is acknowledging that Hungary, being the port of entry to the Euro-
pean Union states with its location, is receiving the most refugees out of
the member-states.  Thus, it is demonstrated that the European Union,
in aiding these “external frontiers,” for example, is staying true to its
mission of opening borders among countries (by the relocation of refu-
gees into other safe member-states).  In so, the European Union is com-
mitted to the human rights and anti-discrimination policies by
protecting the refugees, and is making decisions that take into consid-
eration an individual country’s resources, preferences, and abilities.
While this consideration is based on more practical factors (e.g., the
ability to accommodate the number of refugees in a smaller territory),
the willingness of the European Union to examine these factors may
suggest an understanding of a nation’s preference to place the focus on
the needs of its own citizens.  However, even though there is acknowl-
edgement of individual countries’ abilities, there remains the fact that
the European Union is “commit[ting] to build a single asylum and
migration system” with popular understanding and support that would
create “safe, legal means of migration.”75  In order to be able to enforce
this type of a uniform system, the European Union would need to cre-
ate a system that acknowledges nations’ preferences for things like pre-
serving cultural identity to maximize the utility of the system and to
guarantee nations’ implementation.  Thus, this is why creating a uni-
form system would pose problems for the nations that prioritize differ-
ently from other nations.  Each nation would attempt to solve the
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its citizens need, and what implications taking in refugees would have
on their political, cultural, and economic systems.
IV. THE REFUGEE CRISIS
A. Understanding the Crisis
Months of media coverage and increased attention placed on
European countries have produced conflicting views of the refugee cri-
sis—a crisis that continues to evolve daily.  This difference in reactions
urges a step back in the analysis.  It urges the acknowledgement that a
problem of this scale, without a proactive solution in place, creates an
atmosphere of chaos and moreover, brings to the surface issues that
may have been silenced in the past.  This is why, through the days of
doubling populations, deaths, hunger strikes, and other traumatic inci-
dences, a concept such as “cultural identity” or “opening borders”
becomes as relevant as it is to the present discussion of prospective
remedies.
Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, 4.1 million Syrians
have fled their home country.76  In Europe alone, 750,000 migrants are
estimated to have arrived by sea this year.77  The most popular destina-
tion for migrants is in Germany, with 331,000 asylum applications hav-
ing been received.78  The second most popular destination is
Hungary.79  However, in reality, Hungary has the highest number of
migrants “in proportion to its population.”80  While the exact cause of
the influx of migrants is not necessarily known, as suspicions regarding
terrorism come to the surface, “[t]he conflict in Syria continues to be
by far the biggest driver of the migration.”81  Even with an increasing
number of migrants applying for asylum, European Union countries
have only offered asylum to 184,665 refugees.82  Here, the vast number
of migrants entering Europe creates a frightening truth—there are
more refugees entering a country, and the current protocols that are in
place are simply not enough to combat the problem.83
The number of migrants entering Europe is not the only shocking
statistic.  Statistics dating back to August 2015 report that 2,500
76. Greg Myre, The Migrant Crisis, By the Numbers, NPR (Sept. 8, 2015, 12:34 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/08/438539779/the-migrant-crisis-by-
the-numbers.
77. Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, BBC News (March 4,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (listing statistic estimations, as
the exact numbers are unclear due to an inability to detect all migrants that have passed
through the border).
78. Id. (estimating that one way to calculate how many migrants are arriving in each
country is through the number of asylum applications that are filed, but note that many






83. See id. It is important to acknowledge that Europe is only one of the destina-
tions that migrants are arriving in.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE107.txt unknown Seq: 16 13-JUL-17 10:39
244 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean following an attempt to
migrate overseas, while at least fifty-two migrants were found to have
suffocated due to an overcrowded boat.84  These statistics are growing
at a rapid rate, and many of the deaths or injuries of the migrants are
not being reported.  Thus, it is difficult to fully grasp the consequences
of this large migration to Europe.  Because of the increase in the num-
ber of migrant deaths and injuries over the past several months, coun-
tries have reaffirmed their commitment to embodying the policies of
human rights and humanitarian aid that the European Union is
founded upon.85  These countries acknowledge that this is one of the
greater human rights issues of the time, urging an immediate response
and implementation of refugee systems that are in place.
B. Nations’ Responses to the Refugee Crisis
Several nations have made arrangements with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees to best handle the refugee crisis.  For
example, the Denmark parliament allocates funding to a resettlement
quota annually.86  The nation follows recommendations from the Dan-
ish Immigration Service and the Minister of Justice decides the overall
allocation of the five hundred resettlement places within four different
categories: a geographical category, an emergency and urgent category,
a medical category, and, finally, a category for families that “are
accepted on a dossier basis together with a person accepted as a medi-
cal case under the Twenty-or-More programme” (a program for refu-
gees with special medical needs).87  Denmark also establishes a
criterion for recognition of refugee status eligibility and asylum.  This
allows for exclusion factors to be considered as well as a distinction
between asylum seekers and resettled refugees.88  There are also factors
for considering eligibility of this status.  In its plan, Denmark points out
its opportunity to help particular refugees “get a good and independent
life in Denmark.”89  These examples are sexual minorities, families with
children, adults with educational needs, women at risk with children,
and human rights defenders.90
Given Denmark’s comprehensive plans, many other countries have
followed suit.  Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom are three
countries that often get compared in terms of their responses to the
refugee crisis.  These countries are given a significant amount of focus
because they are countries that are willing to take on a large number of
84. Alison Smale, Melissa Eddy & Kareem Fahim, Europe Reels From More Migrant
Deaths on Land and Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/
29/world/europe/migrants-bodies-austria-truck.html?_r=0.
85. See Kalyeena Makortoff, Pressure mounts on Europe as migrant death toll soars, CNBC
(Aug. 31, 2015, 3:11 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/31/pressure-mounts-on-euro-
pean-policymakers-as-migrant-death-toll-rises.html.
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refugees and do so in a positive manner, encouraging assimilation into
the nation’s political, economic, and cultural spheres.91  The United
Kingdom, like the United States, has not yet committed to a set number
of resettlement places; it is taking in refugees on an urgent need basis—
focusing, specifically, on “‘particularly vulnerable Syrians.”92  Syrian ref-
ugees that are admitted on this basis will receive “humanitarian protec-
tion status, which is an immigration status given to individuals who
need protection but do not meet the refugee criteria defined in the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Proto-
col.”93  This resettlement plan has been criticized because it is “unlikely
to offer a substantial solution to the overburdened states hosting Syrian
refugees or to the massive number of vulnerable Syrians living in
them.”94
In contrast, Germany has been rewarded for being the country that
has “provided the most resettlement places” with Sweden coming in a
close second.95  This is largely due to the number of refugees that are
seeking protection through asylum.  Germany and Sweden “by far,
received the greatest number of asylum applications by Syrian nationals
. . . over a three-year period starting in 2012.”96  In 2014, Germany
received “41,100 Syrian asylum applications” which is three times the
number of applications from 2013, and five times the number from
2012.97  In Sweden, “30,750 Syrian asylum claims were made in 2014,”
also a significant rise since 2012 (with 7,920 made in 2012).98  While
Germany and Sweden are applauded, and should be, for taking on the
large number of migrants, there are certain factors that produce the
differences in numbers among countries where refugees are seeking
asylum.  For example, the differences could be attributed to political
policies and objectives, refugee friendly reputations among asylum
seekers, family ties, ease of access and location, and procedural con-
straints.99  As a result of this acknowledgement that certain factors may
play a mitigating role in how countries respond to the refugee crisis,
two recommendations are made: “Increase burden sharing by the inter-
national community as a whole [and i]ncrease distribution of the bur-
den between states.”100  While these recommendations will later be
focused on more in depth, they present an initial understanding that
for an increase in control over the refugee crisis, many nations need to
bear the burden, not just a selective few.
91. Nicole Ostrand, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Comparison of Responses by Germany,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 255
(2015).  While the United States is also mentioned in this study, it will not be the focus of
this part of the analysis.




96. Id. at 269.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 272.
100. Id. at 273.
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While Germany and Sweden have been acknowledged for their ref-
ugee resettlement plans, there are concerns that they are holding too
much of the burden.  Since these initial plans were created, Germany
has publicized how they are unable to take on more refugees.101  This
suggests that, while these plans were working temporarily, long-term
plans need to be made to aid countries like Germany from being over-
whelmed with the number of refugees.  These remedies are going to
need to examine each nation and its needs individually.
C. Hungary’s Response to the Refugee Crisis
Not all nations are responding to the pressures of rising refugee
death rates and injuries by welcoming large numbers of refugees into
their respective nations.  Because of this, these nations are coming
under fire—with an extra focus placed specifically on Hungary and its
measures.  While many political institutions are quick to claim that
proactive measures are put into place to aid countries in situations
identical to the one Hungary is currently facing, the scale of the current
refugee crisis never could have been accurately predicted.  Despite this,
the United Nations, Amnesty International, the Serbian Prime Minister,
and other countries are reprimanding the Hungarian government for
the measures they have taken as “solutions” to the refugee crisis.  It is
important to note that Hungary’s geography plays an important role in
why refugees are fleeing to the country versus other European Union
member-states.  Hungary is the first port of entry to the European
Union for refugees coming from Syria, explaining why the European
Union, itself, referred to Hungary as an “external frontier.”102  Hun-
gary, as the port of entry, stressed the importance of documenting the
refugees that were entering the country for fear that they would pose a
threat to the Hungarian population.  When this concern was not heard,
Hungary implemented measures of its own.
Initially, the Hungarian government accepted the refugees as they
entered into the country.  When these numbers of migrants began to
increase rather than come to a halt, Hungary took a variety of measures
to prevent migrants from entering the country.103  Among the first
measures was a blockage of the transportation sites around the country
with a razor-wire fence.  Specifically, the Hungarian police force
blocked one of Budapest’s main international train stations to prevent
migrants from going to other European Union countries.104  Many of
101. Jörg Luyken, Germany unable to house 300,000 refugees, THE LOCAL (Nov. 9, 2015,
5:27 PM), http://www.thelocal.de/20151109/germany-hitting-capacity-to-take-in-refu
gees.
102. OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., supra note 70.
103. For the purposes of the discussion in regard to the crisis in Hungary, the terms
“migrant” and “refugee” will be used interchangeably to reflect the uncertainty countries
have surrounding whether or not the individuals entering the respective countries are
economic migrants that are seeking a better life or refugees that are, under the definition
of the 1951 convention, escaping war or persecution.
104. Michele Gorman, Hungary Police Block Migrants from Boarding Trains to EU Coun-
tries, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 2, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/hungary-police-
blocks-migrants-boarding-trains-eu-countries-367898.
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these refugees had desires to reach Germany where the country had
agreed to take on more individuals that were seeking asylum.105  In
response to the blockage, migrants all around the train stations chanted
about peace and freedom, urging the Hungarian police to allow them
to use the transportation system.106  While this blockage was seen as a
harsh, embarrassing action, measures were only increased when the
blockage was met with violence (e.g., breaking through the border
gate), frustration, and anger.  The Hungarian police force began using
tear gas, pepper spray, and water cannons at the southern border of the
country.107  The country reacted in this manner out of concern that the
refugees may have been of a dangerous nature and should not have had
the ability to travel to any country they wanted—especially if they were
fleeing war or persecution.  In an address to Hungary, the United
Nations chief, Ban Ki-Moon, disclosed his feelings surrounding Hun-
gary’s border patrol, “I was shocked to see how these refugees and
migrants were treated.  It’s not acceptable . . . since they are the people
who are fleeing the violence and persecution, we must ensure our com-
passionate leadership.”108  Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Serbia
accused Hungary of “brutal and ‘non-European’ behaviour and urged
the EU to respond.”109  Despite these reprimands, Hungary maintained
that it was doing what was necessary for its country and looking to the
best interests of its people.110
Despite Hungary’s declaration of a state of emergency and count-
less efforts to warn refugees that certain measures would be taken if
there was not cooperation, the actions of Hungary—especially those of
the Prime Minister—have been continuously viewed in a negative light.
In response to why Hungarians are resisting acceptance of newcomers,
many individuals disclosed fears of the individuals that were coming in
such rapids rates to the country.111  One of the reasons given for resis-
tance included, “It’s a different culture.  These people will never be an
inherent part of our communities.”112  Others are worried about the
amount of Hungarian resources it would take to accommodate the
growing rate of refugees, stating, “A lot of Hungarians are angry
because of the migrants, because they think, oh, my God, we have to
pay so much money to take care of these people.  We have to give them
food, accommodation.”113  A smaller group of Hungarians distinguish
the types of individuals that are entering their country, “The Syrians
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Patrick Kingsley, Hungary’s treatment of refugees is shocking and unacceptable, says





111. On the front lines of the refugee crisis, Hungarians worry about accepting newcomers,
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themselves should come because they are in trouble.  But the refugees
that are looking for a better life, maybe they should start making better
lives in their country, rather than look for a better one in another
place.”114
While the reasons for resistance in this small sample of the popula-
tion is not inclusive of all of the reasons Hungarian citizens see the
actions of the Hungarian government as reasonable, they do express
important themes of the refugee crisis, in general.  The most relevant
of these themes is the expression of wanting to preserve the Hungarian
culture.  This is further evidenced by a Syrian refugee’s response to the
Hungarian government’s actions, “We hope that the European people
understand that diversity—diversity is good for them.  We are looking
just for a new life for our children, where they can access schools, where
I can get a job, support my family.”115  While the feeling of sympathy is
widely expressed among the Hungarian population, there is an underly-
ing fear that not all of the Syrian refugees are well intentioned.  The
Hungarian government revealed, in response to criticisms of the mea-
sures they had taken, that a “known terrorist was among one of the 29
people arrested during the clashes.”116  It is clear that the majority of
the Syrian refugees do not pose a threat to the Hungarian population—
or, in fact, to the majority of the European population.  However, this
information revealed by the Hungarian government confirms that
there is a fear in accepting new people into the country without know-
ing anything about their background, their intentions regarding assimi-
lation, and any formal paperwork documenting their journey.
Hungary, serving as an example of a country that has lost much of
its population due to conflict situations,117 has a heightened desire to
protect its citizens from loss.  While this loss, in the past, has been the
loss of individuals’ statuses as Hungarian citizens, it also represents a
loss of cultural identity.  With the fear that Hungary’s cultural identity
could be threatened once again by refugees with their own cultural
identity, Hungary has taken measures that will prevent unmanageable
numbers from entering the country.  The Prime Minister of Hungary
explained that his country “had a ‘democratic right’ to a different
approach but recommended a global solution to the crisis”—one that
would “involve the whole world in the handling of this refugee crisis,
migrant crisis.”118  This is the foundation on which to build the idea
that individual nations have the right to pursue different solutions to
the refugee crisis—especially, when the right to culture or, specifically,
the right to cultural identity is implicated.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Kingsley, supra note 107.
117. This is in reference to the World War I and II history outlined earlier that
resulted in the loss of ethnic Hungarians to Romanian territory.
118. Dan Nolan, Refugee crisis: EU divided as Hungary attacks migrant quota as ‘unreal-
isable and nonsense,’ THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://www.telegraph.co
.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/11884665/Refugee-crisis-EU-divided-as-Hungary-
attacks-migrant-quota-as-unrealisable-and-nonsense.html.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Margin of Appreciation
The margin of appreciation is a doctrine that can aid in the analy-
sis of what could happen if nations were forced to implement uniform
solutions to the refugee crisis.  This is largely due to the fact that the
margin of appreciation demonstrates the level of deference that may be
afforded to nations if they have a legitimate reason for pursuing certain
policies or remedies.  Once an individual has exhausted all domestic
legal remedies, he or she may bring a claim to the European Court of
Human Rights.  The margin of appreciation is used at this level “[to
establish] a methodology for scrutiny by international courts of the
decisions of national authorities—i.e., national governments, national
courts and other national actors.”119  The margin of appreciation is not
absolute—it requires that states exercise their discretion in good faith,
and “international courts are ultimately authorized to review whether
national decisions are reasonable— namely, whether the course of
action selected by the state conforms with the object and purpose of the
governing norm.”120  The source of this doctrine stems from the
“inherent power of international judicial bodies to determine their own
procedures and to effectively exercise their jurisdiction . . . . Such broad
powers arguably include the ability of courts to set applicable standards
of review.”121  Thus, much discretion is afforded to the national deci-
sion-making body, as the decision likely aligns with particular goals and
values of each individual nation.
Two cases serve as examples of how the margin of appreciation is
applied: Lautsi and Others v. Italy and A, B, and C v. Ireland.  The first
case, Lautsi, arose because of the idea that many nations in Europe
allow religious influences to make an appearance in public life and
expression.122  Ms. Lautsi sued on behalf of her two school-age sons,
who were students at an Italian public school.123  Like many of the
other schools in the country, the specific Italian public school at issue
displayed crucifixes in its classrooms.  After exhausting her domestic
remedies, Ms. Lautsi continued to argue in the European Court of
Human Rights that the display of the crucifix was depriving her right to
raise her children as she believed best.124  While, at first, the case was
decided in Ms. Lautsi’s favor, affording her the opportunity to make
decisions about religious upbringing for her children without the coun-
try’s interference, the Grand Chamber overturned the decision and
relied heavily on the margin of appreciation.  The Court ruled that
since the schools were openly tolerant of other religious symbols and
celebrated other religious holidays, the crucifixes were merely an addi-
tional expression of a religion that featured prominently in Italy’s his-
119. Shany, supra note 3, at 909 (2005).
120. Id. at 910–11.
121. Id. at 911.
122. Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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tory.125  Here, it can be seen that the Court was giving significant
deference to Italy’s openly tolerant nature of other religions and the
historical value the crucifixes served.  It recognized the importance of
religion and how it was embodied in the country’s values, thus stating
that a solution in this case could vary according to the country and the
era.126
The same deference to a particular country’s rights was applied in
the case of A, B and C v. Ireland.  The three applicants were women who
were over 18 years of age who travelled to England for an abortion
because their home country of Ireland would not allow them to have
one.127  They argued that the restrictions placed on abortion in Ireland
interfered with their privacy and were in violation of Article 8 of the
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life.128  The decision of the
Court found no violation for two of the applicants because of the mar-
gin of appreciation doctrine.  The “question of the legal protection of
the right to life fell within the States’ margin of appreciation,” as the
margin is construed broadly, not narrowly.129
These cases and the margin of appreciation doctrine become rele-
vant in the discussion of the refugee crisis because of their deference to
the protection of certain states’ values, especially in the realm of reme-
dies.  For example, if a Syrian refugee brought a claim citing the 1951
Convention against Hungary for the measures it had taken in prevent-
ing his or her entrance into the country, and the refugee had
exhausted all domestic remedies to earn a spot in the European Court
of Human Rights, there is a chance that the broad margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine would afford Hungary the deference in determining what
actions to take to best protect its people, especially if its purpose was
mirrored in the remedies used.  This determination would likely be
made after assessing if Hungary acted in good faith when implementing
measures against the refugees.  Given that the Hungarian government
has maintained that it is, and has, advanced measures that it sees neces-
sary for the protection of the country, the margin of appreciation may
prove to be a beneficial legal guideline in resolving whether or not
countries can take individualized solutions in responding to the refugee
crisis.  Additionally, it may offer an assessment of a country’s relevant
history and values to aid in the decision of whether or not the country
was acting in good faith when implementing certain measures or
restrictions.
B. The Reconciliation of the Right to Cultural Identity
and the Right to Refuge
At first glance, the right to refuge and the right to preserve cultural
identity may seem to be in direct conflict with one another.  As dis-
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. A, B & C v. Ireland, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 185.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 246.
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cussed earlier, there are negative consequences for not being able to
exercise either of the two rights.  The importance of reconciling these
rights is best seen in the area of remedies.  Although the European
Union treaties leave immigration and resettlement of refugees in the
hands of individual nations, it has often been said that if the European
Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees could
implement a uniform solution, it would be more successful.  As made
clear by the examples of Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the United King-
dom, and Hungary, nations are unable to reach uniformity in the
implementation of remedies to the refugee crisis.  While this is largely
due to the different criteria countries have of what individuals consti-
tute refugees, the protocols in place, and the lack of enforcement of
these systems, the source may also be that nations do not feel like the
remedies are tailored enough to acknowledge their individual
resources, or lack thereof, or their desire to preserve certain rights for
their citizens (i.e., the right to culture).  Thus, if a uniform plan was
created and enforced by the European Union, it would be highly
unsuccessful.
However, if these remedies were allotted nation-specific modifica-
tions based on a nation’s resources, population, and territory, and
allowed for the recognition of particular state interests like the right to
preserve cultural identity, the implementation and utilization of such a
system would increase dramatically.  This, in turn, would give individu-
als that feel unsafe in their countries the ability to choose what country
they seek refuge in based on a country’s resources, quotas, individual
state interests, etc.  Refugees, then, would not be met with harsh mea-
sures of border patrol if a country was not only prepared to receive
refugees because of a proactive remedy in place but also because it was
aware that its individualized plans would protect the best interests of
both the country and the citizens living in the country.  Individual
countries know their own abilities and resources better than an agent
who merely creates a plan without tailoring it to the individual coun-
tries and without knowing the scope of the problem at hand, forcing
the plan to become more of a reactive measure than a proactive mea-
sure.  Thus, it becomes clear that the right to refuge and the right to
culture or the right to preserve cultural identity, specifically, are not in
opposition with one another when they are both acknowledged and
given the proper protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human rights crises are often the most difficult crises to face.  With
these states of crises come a shocking statistic of injuries and deaths,
forcing nations that have taken the solution most contrary to refugee
rights, by a subjective standard, to serve as the scapegoat.  The difficulty
stems from the fact that the refugee crisis is, in fact, incredibly tragic.
Given this, it becomes crucial to understand how to implement reme-
dies that nations can utilize frequently and willingly.  It is because of
this very need that the discussion of the right to refuge being recon-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-1\NDE107.txt unknown Seq: 24 13-JUL-17 10:39
252 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
ciled with the right to culture became relevant because, through the co-
existence of these rights, remedies become more manageable and
accepted.
In states of emergency, remedies to the emergency tend to be reac-
tive in nature.  This forces nations to consider protection of its own
nations and citizens as of the utmost importance.  While this is what all
citizens of a nation would hope for its leadership, the human rights
issue that may be at stake becomes part of the background rather than
being the focal point it deserves to be.  Given this, it is important to
assess what values a nation aims to protect through its remedies.  In the
context of Hungary, the focus was placed on the fear citizens felt that
an influx of refugees, without the proper system in place, could domi-
nate a Hungarian population that had already experienced a significant
amount of loss.  This loss was not just territorial—it represented a loss
of an identity that Hungarians, typically, show pride towards.  Because
of this, the measures taken were violent and erred more on the side of
skepticism and fear rather than sympathy and acceptance.  The repri-
mands that Hungary has received in response to this solution require a
shift in perspective.  Rather than having other European nations trans-
fer blame onto Hungary—a nation that was being affected by the larg-
est number of refugees—an opportunity was presented to assess what
interests Hungary was protecting.  Once these interests were uncovered,
it would become easier to create remedies that would respond to these
interests and allow practical implementation.
While the right to refuge and the right to preserve one’s cultural
identity have not been frequently tested as at odds with one another,
the present refugee crisis offers an opportunity to both understand the
rights individually and to promote the reconciliation of them.  To best
handle the human rights issue the refugee crisis presents, nations must
be given deference to protect the interests of its own citizenry.  It is
after this deference has been granted that a nation will best be able to
transition from its defensive reaction to the promotion of an open,
understanding, and accepting atmosphere through an individualized,
tailored remedy for refugees.
